Emerging countries tend to default when their economic conditions worsen. If bad times in an emerging country correspond to bad times for the US investor, then these foreign sovereign bonds are particularly risky and should o er high returns. We explore how this mechanism plays out in the data and in a general equilibrium model of optimal borrowing and default. Empirically, we obtain a cross-section of sovereign bond returns: the higher the correlation between past bond returns and US corporate default risk, the higher the average bond returns. A model of risk-averse lenders with external habit preferences can replicate this feature.
In this paper, we study sovereign bonds issued by emerging countries in US dollars. The Euler equation for an American investor implies that sovereign bond prices depend on their default probabilities and on covariances between bond payo s and the investor's marginal utility of wealth. Default probabilities are a well-known driver of emerging bond yields. The worse the Standard & Poor's credit rating, for example, the higher the yield on average. In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that covariances between bond returns and risk factors are key determinants of bond prices and debt quantities.
To illustrate the intuition behind this result, assume that an American investor has constant relative risk-aversion and invests in one-period foreign government bonds. Emerging countries tend to default in 'bad times', when foreign consumption is low. If bad times in the foreign economy correspond to bad times in the domestic economy, then foreign countries tend to default in bad times for the US investor. In this case, sovereign bonds are particularly risky, and the US investor expects to be compensated for that risk through a high return. Alternatively, if bad times in the foreign economy correspond to good times for the US investor, then sovereign bonds are less risky and may even hedge domestic consumption. As a result, sovereign bond prices depend on both expected default probabilities and the timing of default.
With this price mechanism in mind, we turn to the data on sovereign debt. We look at bonds issued by emerging market countries that are included in JP Morgan's EMBI Global index. Yields on EMBI bonds increase with the probability of default as measured by Standard and Poor's credit ratings. However, for a given default probability, there is signi cant cross-sectional variation in yields; at the end of August 2008, for example, spreads were up to 300 basis points. To disentangle the two price mechanisms, we build portfolios of sovereign bonds by sorting countries along two dimensions: their default probabilities and their covariance with US economic conditions. For the rst dimension, we use Standard and Poor's credit ratings to measure the probability of sovereign default. Credit ratings are not investor-speci c and do not account for the timing of a potential default. For the second dimension, we compute bond betas, which are de ned as the slope coe cients in regressions of one-month sovereign bond returns on one-month US corporate bond returns at daily frequency. In our framework, US corporate bond returns proxy for domestic economic conditions and o er a high frequency measurement of investor marginal utility of wealth. This is consistent with the literature on corporate bond indices: Krainer (2004) shows that US corporate credit spreads are counter-cyclical; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) nd that a quarter of corporate bond spreads are due to expected default probabilities, and that the remaining portion compensates for co-movement with Fama and French (1993) risk factors. After sorting countries along these two dimensions, we obtain six portfolios and a large cross-section of holding period excess returns. The average spread between countries with low and high default probabilities is about 600 basis points.
The average spread between countries with low and high bond betas is about 300 basis points.
We study this cross-section of excess returns from the perspective of a US investor. We nd that a large fraction of the cross-section of EMBI excess returns can be explained by their covariances with just two risk factors: average EMBI excess returns and returns from a strategy that goes long on the last portfolio and short on the rst. The rst risk factor represents the average return for an investor holding bonds issued by all EMBI countries. The second risk factor represents the excess returns from a zero-cost strategy that goes long on the corner portfolio with the highest sovereign default risk and the highest exposure to US corporate default risk, and short on the corner portfolio with the smallest sovereign default risk and the lowest exposure to US corporate default risk. Portfolios with higher exposure to the second risk factor are riskier and have higher average excess returns because they o er lower returns when US corporate default risks are higher.
To interpret our ndings and uncover their implications in terms of optimal borrowing, we use a general equilibrium model of sovereign lending and default. We start from Arellano (2008) and extend her model to N sovereign borrowers. In our model, a set of small open economies borrow from a large developed country (the US). We consider endowment economies. The only source of heterogeneity across small open economies is their correlation with the US business cycle. We introduce a key modi cation to Arellano (2008) : we assume that investors are riskaverse and have external habit preferences as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . This feature helps our understanding of the data: without it, eg when investors are risk-neutral, there is no role for covariances in sovereign bond prices. In the model, countries default after receiving a series of negative shocks. When business cycles in emerging countries and in the US are positively correlated, defaults tend to occur when US consumption is low relative to the habit level. Bonds issued by these countries are riskier and have lower prices because they have low payo s when the lender's marginal utility of consumption is high. As Arellano (2008) shows, the model matches important features of the emerging markets business cycle. Consumption is more volatile than output; interest rate spreads and trade balances are strongly counter-cyclical. We thus focus on the model's implications for bond pricing, and we reproduce on simulated data the experiment also run on actual data.
Using simulated data, we form portfolios by sorting countries, again, along two dimensions: probability of default and correlation with the US business cycle. In our simulations, excess returns increase along the two sorting variables. We focus here on the corner portfolios. First, countries with high default probabilities pay on average up to 130 points more than low default probability countries. This spread characterizes low beta countries. For high beta countries, the spread due to default probability almost double to attain 250 basis points. These spreads are large and signi cant, but somewhat lower than in the data. Second, high beta countries pay on average higher yields than low beta countries. The di erence in yields is only 20 basis points if the default probability is low, but it jumps to 130 basis points for high default probabilities. The model o ers a general equilibrium view of debt quantities and prices. Bond issues and defaults are endogenous choices: countries facing high borrowing costs might choose to borrow less, thereby lowering their default risk. In the simulations, high beta countries pay higher interest rates even if they borrow less in equilibrium.
Two discrepancies between the model and the data are worth mentioning. First, in the model, we can precisely measure expected default probabilities and consumption correlation, so we do not need to rely on proxies like Standard and Poor's ratings or corporate spreads. Second, the model only considers one-period bonds, whereas actual bonds have longer maturities. As as result, the model does not take into account interest rate risk. We leave this interesting case out for future research.
This paper is related to two strands of existing literature on sovereign debt. First, this paper contributes to the large body of empirical literature on emerging market bond spreads. The paper closest to ours is Longsta , Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2007) . They study changes in emerging market credit default swaps spreads and nd that global factors, like the return on the U.S. stock market and changes in the VIX index, explain a large fraction of the common variation in swap spreads. They argue very convincingly that excess returns are mostly compensation for bearing global risk, with little or no country speci c risk premia. 1 Second, our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on sovereign lending with defaults. The paper closest to ours is Arellano (2008) . She builds on the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of sovereign lending with endogenous default choice. 2 We build on her work. The main di erence between our two models is our assumption that foreign lenders are risk averse and not risk neutral. This assumption is crucial in generating the cross section of portfolio returns. We show that a model with risk neutral investors cannot account for the results of our empirical analysis on EMBI bonds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data, how we build EMBI portfolios, and the main characteristics of the EMBI portfolio excess returns. Section 2 shows that two global risk factors explain most of the time series variation in portfolio excess returns. In section 3, we interpret these ndings by describing a general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing. Section 4 considers a calibrated version of the model that qualitatively replicates our empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes. All the tables and gures are in the appendix.
The Cross-Section of EMBI Returns
We focus on sovereign bonds issued in US dollars by emerging countries. To study these bonds, we take the perspective of a US investor who borrows in dollars to invest in this bond market. We check that these bonds o er return that increase with the probability of default, as measured by Standard and Poor's country ratings. We uncover a second mechanism: the higher the sovereign bond's covariance with US corporate default risk, the higher the excess returns. Using these two results, we build portfolios along two dimensions and obtain a cross-section of EMBI excess returns.
We start by describing the raw data and setting up some notations. Then we turn to our portfolio-building methodology, and report the main characteristics of our cross-section of EMBI excess returns.
Data and notations
Data on Emerging Markets We focus on the set of countries included in JP Morgan's EMBI Global index. JP Morgan publishes country-speci c and aggregate indices that market participants consider as benchmarks. The EMBI Global index covers low or middle income per capita countries (according to the World Bank's classi cation). It also includes countries that are currently -or have been in the past ten years -restructuring their external or local debts. Our main dataset thus contains 36 countries: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippine, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
The JP Morgan EMBI Global total return price index includes accrued dividends and cash payments. In each country, the index is a market capitalization-weighted aggregate of US dollardenominated Brady Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local market debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. The weight of each instrument in each country-speci c index is determined by dividing the issue's market capitalization by the total market capitalization for all instruments in the index. The market capitalization of each issue corresponds to its face value outstanding multiplied by its bid-side settlement price. Weights are updated at the end of each month (see Cavanagh and Long (1999) ). These bonds are liquid debt instruments actively traded. Their notional sizes are at least equal to $500 million. Each issue included in the EMBI Global index must have at least 2.5 years until maturity when it enters the index and at least 1 year until maturity to remain in the index. Moreover, JP Morgan sets liquidity criteria such as easily accessible and veri able daily prices either from an inter-dealer broker or a certi ed JP Morgan source.
To assess the default probability of each country, we rely on Standard and Poor's ratings. Standard and Poor's credit ratings take the form of letter grades ranging from AAA (highest credit worthiness) to SD (selective default). They are available for a large set of countries over a long time period. We collect Standard and Poor's ratings for all the 36 countries in the EMBI index, except Cote d'Ivoire and Iraq. We focus on ratings for long-term debt denominated in foreign currencies and convert ratings into numbers ranging from 1 (highest credit worthiness) to 23 (lowest credit worthiness). Our sample contains several default episodes. Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Russia and Uruguay defaulted on their external debt during our sample period. Ratings are not traded prices. This obvious fact has two consequences. First, ratings are not tailored to a particular investor. For example, they are the same for a US and a Japanese investor. As a result, ratings do not not take into account the timing of a potential sovereign default: a country that might default in good times for the US has the same rating as a country that might default in bad times. Second, for most countries, credit ratings do not encompass all the information on expected defaults. They are not updated on a regular basis, but rather when new information or events suggest the need for additional Standard and Poor's studies and grade revisions.
To complement the Standard and Poor's ratings, it is now common to rely on credit default swaps (CDS) and debt to GNP ratios. These two measures do not seem appropriate for our study. CDS are insurance contracts against the event that a sovereign defaults on its debt over a given horizon (see Pan and Singleton (2008) ). These contracts are traded in US dollars. As a result, their prices should re ect both the magnitude and the timing of expected defaults. Yet, our goal is to disentangle these two elements. Moreover, CDS data are only available from December 2002 on, and for a subset of the EMBI Global countries. Debt to GNP ratios are available for many countries, but at annual frequency. These ratios do not predict default probabilities and returns as well than Standard and Poor's ratings. To check, however, that high debt levels do not drive our results, we report debt to GNP ratios. Our series come from the World Bank Global Development Finance annual dataset. We linearly interpolate the annual debt to GNP ratios to obtain monthly series.
As a snapshot of our dataset, Figure 1 reports, for each country in JP Morgan's EMBI Global Index, the annual stripped spread plotted against the Standard and Poor's credit rating at the end of August 2008. The stripped spread is equal to the di erence between the average yield to maturity in the emerging country and the corresponding yield to maturity on the US Treasury spot curve, after`stripping' out the value of any collateralized cash ows. These spreads correspond to the usual representation of sovereign risk premia. Throughout the rest of the paper though, we use index prices to compute returns.
Notations Before turning to our portfolio-building strategy, we introduce here some useful notations. Let r e;i denote the log excess return, including any accrued dividends, of an American investor who borrows funds in US dollars at the log risk free rate r f in order to buy country i's EMBI bond and sells it after one month. His log excess return is equal to: where p i t denotes the log market price of an EMBI bond in country i at date t. We de ne the bond beta ( i EMBI ) of each country i's as the slope coe cient in a regression of EMBI bond returns on US BBB-rated corporate bond returns:
where r BBB t denotes the log total return on the Merrill Lynch US BBB corporate bond index. We compute betas on 100-day rolling windows to obtain time-series of i EMBI;t . As a timing convention, we date t the beta estimated with returns up to date t. For each regression, we estimate the beta at date t only if at least 50 observations for both the left-and right-hand side variables are available over the previous 100-day rolling window period.
Portfolios of Excess Returns
EMBI portfolios We build portfolios of EMBI excess returns by sorting countries along two dimensions: their probabilities of defaults and their bond betas. First, at the end of each period t, we sort all countries in the sample in two groups on the basis of their bond betas EMBI;t . The rst group contains the countries with the lowest EMBI;t , the second group contains the countries with the highest EMBI;t . Second, we sort all countries within each of the two groups in three portfolios ranked from low to high probabilities of default. We measure default probabilities with Standard and Poor's credit ratings. As a result, we obtain six portfolios. Portfolios 1, 2 and 3 contain countries with the lowest betas, portfolios 3, 4 and 5 contain countries with the highest betas. Portfolios 1 and 4 contain countries with the lowest default probabilities, portfolios 3 and 6 contain countries with the highest default probabilities. Portfolios are re-balanced at the end of every month, using information available at that point. We compute the EMBI excess returns r e;j t+1 for portfolios j by taking the average of the EMBI excess returns in each portfolios j over the subsequent period (e.g between t and t + 1). The total number of countries in our portfolios varies over time. We have 6 countries at the beginning of the sample in January, 1995 and 32 at the end in August, 2008. 3 The maximum number of countries attained during the sample is 32. 4 Table 1 provides an overview of our six EMBI portfolios. For each portfolio j, we report the average foreign bond beta j EMBI , the average total excess return r e;j , the average Standard and Poor's credit rating and the average external debt to GNP ratio. All returns are reported in US dollars and the moments are annualized: we multiply the mean of the monthly return by 12 and the standard deviation by p 12. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation.
Our portfolios highlight two simple empirical facts. Excess returns increase from low to high betas: portfolio 1, 2 and 3 (low betas) o er lower excess returns than portfolios 4, 5 and 6 (high betas). Excess returns also increase from low to high default probabilities: portfolios 1 and 4 (low default probabilities) o er lower excess returns than portfolios 3 and 6 (high default probabilities). The average excess return on all the low beta portfolios is 650 basis points per annum. For the high beta portfolios, it is 940 basis points. As a result, there is almost a 300 basis points di erence between high and low beta portfolios. For low beta countries, the spread between low and high default probabilities entails a 340 basis point di erence in returns. For high beta countries, this di erence jumps to almost 900 basis points. On average, the spread due to default probabilities is close to 600 basis points. These two empirical facts square well with intuition. An investor receives higher returns to compensate for higher default probabilities. If the investor is risk-averse, then he expects higher returns for assets that co-vary with his return on wealth.
These spreads are economically and statistically signi cant. As a back-of-the-envelope check to this point, note that the standard error on the mean estimate is approximately equal to the standard deviation of the excess returns divided by the square root of the number of observations. The average standard deviation is equal to 12 percent. The sample size is 164 quarters (12:8 2 ). The standard error on the mean is thus below 1 percent, approximately equal to 95 basis points. A spread of 300 basis points corresponds to three times the standard deviation of the mean. Patton and Timmermann (2008) propose a more precise test of these cross-sectional properties. We use their non-parametric test to examine whether there exists a monotonic mapping from the observable variables used to sort EMBI countries into portfolios, and expected returns. The test rejects at standard signi cance levels the null of the absence of a monotonic relationship between portfolio ranks and returns against the alternative of an increasing pattern (the p-value is 1:5%).
By sorting countries along their Standard and Poor's ratings and bond betas, we have obtained a rich cross-section of average excess returns. We now turn to the dynamic properties of these portfolios.
Common Risk Factors in EMBI Excess Returns
In this section, we show that two risk factors reproduce our cross-section of excess returns. To build our risk factors, we start o a statistical description of our portfolios.
Principal Component Analysis
A principal component analysis provides a simple framework for extracting factors that are important for capturing common variation in asset returns. Let be the sample covariance matrix of excess returns on the original set of EMBI portfolios R e . The eigenvalue decomposition of this covariance matrix = Q Q 0 yields a new covariance matrix which is diagonal, and the orthogonal transformation matrix Q which satis es QQ 0 = I. This matrix contains the loadings of the original portfolios on the orthogonal common factors (or principal components) . These new portfolios excess returns are:
Since the original test assets are excess returns, this procedure also creates zero-investment portfolios, i.e. the resulting factors are excess returns. The variance-covariance matrix of these portfolios is the diagonal matrix above. Table 2 reports the loadings of our EMBI portfolios on each of the principal components (i.e. the Q matrix) as well as the fraction of the total variance of portfolio returns attributed to each principal component (diag =tr ). This principal component analysis reveals that 80 percent of the portfolio excess returns common variation is explained by the rst two principal components. The rst principal component is indistinguishable from the mean portfolio excess returns, while the second principal component is highly correlated with the di erence between the sixth and rst portfolio. Following this decomposition, we consider two risk factors, the average EMBI excess returns, denoted R EMBI , and the di erence between the last and rst portfolio, denoted LS EMBI because it is equivalent to the excess return of a zero-cost strategy that goes long on the last portfolio and short on the rst. The correlation of the rst principal component with R EMBI is 0.99, and the correlation between the second principal component and LS EMBI is -0.83. We nd that a large fraction of the cross-section of EMBI excess returns described in section 1 can be explained by their covariances with just two risk factors, the EMBI market excess return (R EMBI ) and the return from a strategy that goes long on the last portfolio, and short on the rst (LS EMBI ). We now review the cross-sectional asset pricing methodology and then report our results.
Asset Pricing Methodology
Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing We use R e;j t+1 to denote the average excess return on portfolio j in period t + 1. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, this excess return has a zero price and satis es the following Euler equation:
where M denotes the stochastic discount factor of the US investor. We assume that the log stochastic discount factor m is linear in the pricing factors f :
where b is the vector of factor loadings and denotes the factor means. This linear factor model implies a beta pricing model: the log expected excess return is equal to the factor price times the beta of each portfolio j : E[ r e;j ] = 0 j where r e;j denotes the log excess return on portfolio j corrected for its Jensen term, = f f b, f f = E(f t f ) 0 is the variance-covariance matrix of the factor, and j denotes the regression coe cients of the return R e;j on the factors. To estimate the factor prices and the portfolio betas , we use two di erent procedures: a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) applied to linear factor models, following Hansen (1982) , and a two-stage OLS estimation following Fama and MacBeth (1973) , henceforth FMB. We brie y describe these two techniques.
GMM The moment conditions are the sample analog of the populations pricing errors:
where r e t = [ r e;1 t ; r e;2 t ; :::; r e;N t ] 0 groups all the N EMBI portfolios. In the rst stage of the GMM estimation, we use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix, while in the second stage we use the inverse of the spectral density S matrix of the pricing errors in the rst stage: S = E[(m t r e t )(m t j r e t j ) 0 ]: 5 We use demeaned factors in both stages. Since we focus on linear factors models, the rst stage is equivalent to an OLS cross-sectional regression of average returns on the second moment of returns and factors. The second stage is a GLS cross-sectional regression of average excess returns on the second moment of returns and factors. FMB In the rst stage of the FMB procedure, for each portfolio j, we run a time-series regression of the EMBI excess returns r e t on a constant and the factors f t , in order to estimate j . The only di erence with the rst stage of the GMM procedure stems from the presence of a constant in the regressions. In the second stage, we run a cross-sectional regression of the average excess returns E T (m t r e t ) on the betas that were estimated in the rst stage, to estimate the factor prices . The rst stage GMM estimates and the FMB point estimates are identical, because we do not include a constant in the second step of the FMB procedure. Finally, we can back out the factor loadings b from the factor prices and covariance matrix of the factors. Table 3 reports our asset pricing results. We focus rst on market prices of risk and then turn to the quantities of risk in our portfolios.
Results
Market Prices of Risk The top panel of the table reports estimates of the market price of risk and the SDF factor loadings b, the adjusted R 2 , the square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE and the p-values of 2 tests (in percentage points). The market price of risk of the R EMBI risk factor is equal to 780 basis points per annum. The FMB standard error is 272 basis points. The market price of risk of the LS EMBI risk factor is equal to 980 basis points per annum and the FMB standard error is 325 basis points. In both cases, the risk price is more than two standard errors from zero, and thus highly statistically signi cant. Overall, asset pricing errors are small. The RMSE is around 114 basis points and the adjusted R 2 is 78 percent. The null that the pricing errors are zero cannot be rejected, regardless of the estimation procedure. Figure 2 plots predicted against realized excess returns for the six EMBI portfolios. Clearly, the model's predicted excess returns are consistent with the average excess returns. Note that predicted excess returns correspond here simply the OLS estimates of the betas times the sample mean of the factors, not the estimated prices of risk.
Since the factors are returns, the no arbitrage condition implies that risk prices should be equal to the factors' average excess returns. This condition stems from the fact that the Euler equation applies to the risk factor itself, which clearly has a regression coe cient of one on itself. In our estimation, this no-arbitrage condition is satis ed. The average portfolio excess return is 794 basis points. So the estimated price of risk for R EMBI is only 14 basis points removed from the point estimate implied by linear factor pricing. The average excess return on the strategy that goes long on the last portfolio and short on the rst is 910 basis points. So the estimated price of risk of LS EMBI is 70 basis points removed from the point estimate. The standard error on the mean estimate is equal to 88 basis points. As a consequence, the mean is not statistically di erent from the market price of risk.
Alphas and betas in EMBI returns The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the constants (denoted j ) and the slope coe cients (denoted j R EMBI and j LS EMBI ) obtained by running time-series regressions of each portfolio's excess returns r x e;j on a constant and the R EMBI and LS EMBI risk factors.
The rst column reports 's estimates. The s for each portfolio are generally small and not signi cantly di erent from zero. The null that the s are jointly zero is rejected at the 5 percent signi cance level. The second column reports the s for the R EMBI factor. These s increase monotonically from 0.95 to 1.44 for the low EMBI group, while for the second EMBI group they increase from 0.54 for portfolio 4 to 0.97 for portfolio 5 and then slightly decrease to 0.95 for portfolio 6. The third column reports the s for the LS EMBI factor. These s are negative for the low EMBI group and positive for the high EMBI group. The higher default probability, high bond betas portfolio o ers high excess returns on average because they loads more heavily on the risk factors.
By sorting countries along their Standard and Poor's ratings and bond betas, we have obtained a cross-section of average excess returns which re ects di erent risk exposures. To move from a statistical description of the risk factors to their economic interpretation, we now specify a general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing that can potentially replicate our previous ndings. The main intuition is as follows. When investors are risk averse and the endowment process in the borrowing country is potentially correlated with lenders' marginal utilities of consumption, the pricing of a sovereign bond depends not only on the probability of default but also on its correlation with the investors' stochastic discount factor.
A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Borrowing
In this section, we build a N-country model of sovereign borrowing to interpret the empirical properties of the EMBI portfolios documented in the previous section. We start o the seminal two-country models of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) . 6 But we depart from the previous literature and assume that lenders are risk averse, instead of being risk-neutral, and that emerging countries' business cycles di er in their correlations to the US business cycle.
This simple departure has key implications on sovereign bond prices. We know that emerging countries tend to default when they experience di cult economic conditions. Again, if bad times in emerging countries correspond to bad times for the investor, then sovereign bonds appear risky: they pay badly in bad times. A risk-averse investor will expect to be compensated for that risk: he will earn on average a premium on these bonds, or equivalently, these bonds will trade at a lower value than their simple, discounted expected payo s. If bad times in emerging countries correspond to good times for the investor, then sovereign bonds appear less risky: they pay badly in good times, and well in bad times. If the investor is risk-averse, these bonds trade at a higher value than their simple, discounted expected payo s.
Endowments
We explore this mechanism and its general equilibrium implications. In the large developed economy, there is a representative agent that receives every period an exogenous consumption endowment. We assume that idiosyncratic shocks to consumption growth are i:i:d: log-normally distributed:
6 The literature on sovereign debt modeling is large. Important examples are Bulow and Rogo (1989) , Atkeson (1991) , Kehoe and Levine (1993) , Zame (1993), Cole and Kehoe (2000) , Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , Kocherlakota (1996) , Amador (2003) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) .
The emerging countries only di er according to their conditional correlation to the developed economy: E( B;i 0 L ) = i .
All variables in the model are real, and we abstract from monetary policies. In each emerging economy, a benevolent government maximizes the welfare of its representative citizen. To do so, the government can borrow resources from the developed country. The government, however, can only trade non contingent one-period zero coupon bonds. These debt contracts are not enforceable: the government can choose to default on its debts at any point in time. In this set-up, if investors are risk neutral, the price of a sovereign bond depends exclusively on the endogenous probability of default, which varies with the amount of funds borrowed and the expected next-period endowment. As a result, sovereign bond prices only depend on country-speci c characteristics and the large common variation in bond prices observed in the data can only be explained by a high degree of correlation across the countries' endowment processes, leaving no role for systematic risk factors related to foreign investors. But if investors are risk-averse, then sovereign bond prices re ect the correlation between the emerging economy' business cycle and the US economy.
Borrowers
We start with the description of the borrowers. where B denotes the time discount factor, and C B t denotes consumption at time t. We let the lenders' and borrowers' discount factors di er because developing countries tend to have higher real risk free rates than emerging countries. 7 The representative household receives a stochastic stream of the tradable good Y B t every period. We assume that y B t , the log of the borrower's endowment, follows a Markov process. The representative agent also receives a goods transfer from the government in a lump-sum fashion: i.e, any proceeds from international operations are rebated lump-sum from the government to its citizens. The government has access to international capital markets: at the beginning of period t, it can purchase B t+1 t one-period zero-coupon bonds at price Q t . B t+1 t denotes the quantity of one-period zero-coupon bonds purchased at date t and coming to maturity at date t + 1. A positive value for B t+1 t represents a saving for the borrowing country, which supplies Q t B t+1 t units of period t goods 7 Political economists argue that politicians tend to have shorter time horizons in small developing countries. In Amador (2003) for example, a low value for the discount factor B corresponds to the high short-term discount rate of an incumbent party with low probability of remaining in power in a model where di erent parties alternate. In case of default, all current debt disappears. This simplifying assumption implies that the sovereign cannot selectively default on parts of its debt. 8 A sovereign that defaults at date t is excluded from international capital markets for a stochastic number of periods and su ers a direct output loss. In this case, consumption is constrained by the value of output during autarky, which is denoted Y def t , and the budget constraint is simply: . This form of direct output cost implies that defaults are more costly in good times. A country that receives a high value of Y B expects high values of the endowment also in the near future, given the high persistence of the endowment process. If the country defaults when Y B is high, its consumption is set to be low for the entire time of exclusion from capital markets according to the budget constraint (3.3). When the endowment is high, the utility cost of default (which lasts several periods) is likely to outweigh the utility bene t from not repaying the outstanding debt (which lasts one period). This speci c way of modeling the output cost is critical for this class of models to produce a counter-cyclical current account. In fact, this assumption constraints the timing of borrowing. Consider a country that receives a particularly low value of the endowment. This country would like to borrow to smooth out consumption. Given the high persistence of the endowment process, this country also expects low values of the endowment in the near future. If the endowment is low enough and the country defaults, the direct output cost is likely to be low for the entire exclusion period (because Y B <Ŷ B ). At the same time, when the endowment is low, the marginal utility cost of a net capital out ow is very high for a risk averse borrower. Investors anticipate that the borrower is likely to default in this case and they require a high premium to supply any funds. In equilibrium, when Y B is low enough, there is no borrowing and the sovereign is credit-rationed. Therefore, this assumption a ects both the size and timing of debt in equilibrium. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use a model similar to Arellano (2008) , but with a cost of default that is a xed proportion of the borrower's endowment. Comparing their results to Arellano (2008) , they obtain larger debt to GDP ratios, lower default probabilities and lower interest rate spreads, and they cannot reproduce the counter-cyclicality of the current account. We choose the default cost assumption used in Arellano (2008) because it is a convenient way to ensure that countries borrow more when output is above trend, a robust feature of emerging economies' business cycle (see for example Neumeyer and Perri (2005) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) or Uribe and Yue (2006) ). A second reason to use the default cost assumption in Arellano (2008) is the fact that countries tend to default when output is below trend (Tomz (2007) ) and it is di cult to determine whether the fall in output is the reason for defaulting, or rather the consequence of the default.
A second consequence of a country's default is exclusion from international capital markets. In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) exclusion is permanent, and default is not an equilibrium outcome. We follow Arellano (2008) and assume that exclusion lasts a stochastic number of periods. Although this assumption implies a degree of coordination by foreign investors that is partially at odds with the assumption that investors behave competitively, it captures the fact that countries in default do not access international capital markets for some time. As Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2007) note, in this framework, the equilibrium size of debt is smaller when the exclusion from capital markets is shorter. This is because exclusion works an incentive to repay, thus reassuring lenders, decreasing the risk premium and allowing more borrowing.
Lenders
We now turn to the description of the lenders. The representative agent receives an exogenous stochastic consumption endowment every period denoted C L t . Lenders are risk-averse and behave competitively. In order to reproduce the large spread between low and high beta countries, we rely on habit preferences similar to Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . We assume that lenders maximize the stream of discounted utilities U L :
where L denotes the lenders' discount factor and H t the external habit level. 9 The external habit level corresponds to a time-varying subsistence level or social externality.
Habit preferences reproduce quantitatively the e ect of the timing of defaults on bond spreads. We show in the appendix that a model where borrowers and lenders have the same power utility preferences does not produce a large spread in excess returns. The maximum spread between high and low correlation groups in the latter case is only 55 basis points, an order of magnitude smaller than in the data. This result parallels the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985) . To illustrate this point, assume that two countries have the same default probability and the same yield volatility. Then the spreads between their bond returns depend on the covariance between the US marginal utility of consumption and the return di erences. As a result, the maximum spread between these two countries is twice the product of the risk-aversion coe cient times the standard deviation of consumption growth (around 1.5 percent) and the standard deviation of the returns (around 6 percent). A risk-aversion coe cient of 2 would imply a maximum spread of 18 basis points. A risk-aversion coe cient close to 40 would then lead to a spread of 4 percent as in the data, but it would also imply a very high and volatile risk free rate. On the contrary, the introduction of habit preferences implies that lenders' risk aversion is time-varying, and higher in 'bad times'. As consumption declines toward the habit in 'bad times', the curvature of the utility function rises, so risky assets prices fall and expected returns rise. Local risk-aversion is sometimes very high, even of the risk-aversion coe cient remains low.
Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , we assume that the external habit level depends on the consumption endowment through the following autoregressive process for the surplus consumption ratio, de ned as the percentage gap between the endowment and habit
where c L is the average consumption growth. The sensitivity function (s L t ) describes how habits are formed from past aggregate endowments. In this framework,`bad times' refers to times of low surplus consumption ratios (when consumption is close to the habit level), and`negative shocks' refers to negative consumption growth shocks L . The sensitivity function (s L t ) governs the dynamic of the surplus consumption ratio: 
L 2 . This model delivers time-varying risk aversion for the lenders. Since the habit level depends on aggregate consumption, the local curvature of the lenders' utility function is t = =S L t . When the endowment is close to the habit level, the surplus consumption ratio is low and the lender very risk averse.
Lenders supply any quantity of funds demanded by the small open economy, but they require compensation for the risk they bear. Lenders cannot default. In Arellano (2008) , lenders are riskneutral. In that case, lenders charge the borrower the interest rate that makes them break-even in expected value. In our model, lenders are risk-averse, and require not only a default premium, but also a default risk premium. They expect a higher return on average if defaults are more likely in bad times for them, i.e when their endowment is close to the habit level.
Recursive equilibrium
In order to describe the economy at time t, we need to keep track of the borrower's endowment stream, his outstanding debt, and the lender's past surplus consumption ratios. Let y B and s L denote the history of events up to t: y B = (y B 0 ; :::; y B t ) and s L = (s L 0 ; :::; s L t ). We denote x a column vector that summarizes this information: x = [y B ; s L ] 0 . Given that the two stochastic endowment processes are Markovian, we denote f (x 0 ; x) the conditional density of x 0 , e.g. the value of x at time t + 1 given the initial value of x at time t. In what follows, the value of a variable in period t + 1 is denoted with a prime superscript.
Given the initial state of the economy, the value of the default option is: where is the exogenous probability of re-entering international capital markets after a default. 10 As we have seen, when a borrower defaults, consumption is equal to the autarky value of output. In the following period, the borrower regains access to international capital markets with no outstanding debt with probability , or remains in autarky with probability 1 .
The value of staying in the contract and repaying debt coming to maturity is: The default probability dp is endogenous and depends on the amount of outstanding debt and on the endowment realization. In particular, the default probability is related to the default set through: dp(B 0 ; x) = D (B 0 ) f (x 0 ; x)dx 0 ;
where dp(B 0 ; x) denotes the expectation at time t of a default at time t + 1 for a given level B 0 of 10 Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) explore the possibility of endogenizing .
outstanding debt due at time t + 1.
Bond Prices
Bond prices Q(B 0 ; x) are a function of the current state vector x and the desired level of borrowing B 0 . If borrowers do not default at date t + 1, lenders receive payo s equal to the face value of the bonds, which is normalized to 1. In case of default at date t + 1, payo s are zero. Starting from the investor's Euler equation, the bond price function is:
Q(B 0 ; x) = E[M 0 1 1 dp(B 0 ;x) ] = E[M 0 ]E[1 1 dp(B 0 ;x) ] + cov [M 0 ; 1 1 dp(B 0 ;x) ]; ( 3.4) where M 0 is the investors' stochastic discount factor and is equal to:
A risk free asset pays one unit of consumption good in any state of the world and has a price equal to Q rf = E[M 0 ]. If investors are risk-neutral, sovereign bond prices depend only on expected default probabilities: Q(B 0 ; x) == E[1 1 dp(B 0 ;x) ]=Q rf . Investors' risk aversion introduce a new component to sovereign bond pricing. For a given default probability, bond prices depend on the covariance between investors' stochastic discount factors and default events. If defaults tend to occur in bad times for investors (e.g when their marginal utility of consumption is high), the covariance term in (3.4) is negative, bond prices are low and yields are high. Likewise, if defaults tend to occur in good times for investors, yields are low.
Simulation
We simulate the model at quarterly frequency. We start by rapidly reviewing its parameters. We calibrate the borrower's endowment process described in (3.1) using the parameters in Arellano (2008) . These parameters describe Argentina. We calibrate lenders' consumption growth using the post-war U.S. economy as a reference. Habit preference parameters are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . Table 4 reports all the parameters used in the simulation. The direct output cost of default is equal to 2:5 percent per period in line with the evidence of a signi cant output drop in the aftermath of a default (see, for example, Rose (2005) ). The probability of re-entering capital markets after a default is equal to 12:5 percent per period, implying an average exclusion of 8 quarters. The empirical evidence on the time-length of exclusion is mixed. For example, Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) nd that in the 1980s the average time of exclusion is 4.7 years, while only 0.3 years in the 1990s. 11 The risk aversion parameter in the borrowers' and lenders' utility function is set equal to 2. Lenders discount future at the annualized rate L = 0:89, while the borrower has a lower time discount factor B = 0:83. The value of and L are calibrated in order to match an average US real log risk-free rate of 0.94 percent per annum. Models of this class require low values for B in order to generate larger values for the debt to GDP ratio. For example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use an annualized value for B equal to 0:59. We take B from Arellano (2008) . A low value for B matches the usually high real interest rates in emerging markets. The computational algorithm is described in the appendix.
Building Portfolios of Simulated Data
In equilibrium, investors know expected default probabilities and require higher risk premia from borrowers that are more likely to default when investors' consumption is close to their habit levels. We solve our model for a set of 34 uniformly spaced di erent values of i , which is the correlation between investors' consumption growth and borrower's endowments. These correlation coe cients are in the range [ :5; :5] . Each i corresponds to a di erent sovereign borrower. We simulate time series data for countries that di er only with respect to i and face the same time series for investors' consumption growth. The values for all the other parameters are those in Table 4 .
We use the simulated data to build portfolios that mimic the EMBI portfolios described in section 1. What are the equivalents to Standard and Poor's ratings and EMBI bond betas that we used in section 1 on actual data? In the model, expected default probabilities exist in closed form. We do not need to rely on ratings to proxy them. We denote E[dp i ] the investors' expectation that country i will default next period. In the model, we also have a more direct measure of the business cycle's correlation with the US economy than the bond betas we previously computed. Here, we obtain i SIM as the slope coe cient from a regression of the borrower i's past output growth up to time t on a constant and the investor's past endowment growth up to time t. We use a rolling window of 250 periods.
The building portfolio strategy runs again in two steps. First, at the end of each period t, we sort all countries in the sample into 2 groups on the basis of the observed i SIM at that time. The rst group contains countries with the lowest i SIM , the second group contains countries with the highest i SIM . Second, at the end of each period t, we sort all countries within each of the previous 2 groups into 3 portfolios on the basis of the expected default probability E[dp i ] at that time. Within each group, the rst portfolio contains countries with the smallest expected default probabilities and the last portfolio contains countries with the highest default probabilities. The 6 portfolios are re-balanced at the end of every period. For each portfolio j, we compute the excess returns r e;j t+1 by taking the average of the excess returns in the portfolio. Excess returns correspond to the returns in emerging countries minus the risk-free rate in the large, developed economy. We have a total of 34 simulated countries, for 5,000 quarters. We compute j SIM starting in quarter 500 and use the last 600 quarters for our analysis (150 years). Countries in default in a given quarter are excluded from the sample, given that they do not have access to international capital markets. As a result, the total number of countries in our portfolios varies slightly over time. Table  5 provides an overview of the 6 portfolios.
For each portfolio j, we report the average value for j SIM , the excess return r e;j , the expected default probability E[dp j ] and the debt to output ratio. All the moments are annualized: we multiply the mean of the quarterly data by 4 and the standard deviation by 2. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the annualized mean to the annualized standard deviation.
The rst panel reports the average j SIM for countries in portfolio j. There is a stark contrast between the rst three and the last three portfolios. The business cycle of countries with a low j SIM is negatively correlated with the investors' endowment growth. These countries on average default more frequently when investors' consumption is high and above their habit levels. On the contrary, countries with a high j SIM default more frequently when investors' consumption is low and close to their habit levels. The second panel reports average expected default probabilities. Within each low;high SIM -group, there is a cross-section of average default probabilities, with a spread up to 2.5 percent. These rst two panels correspond to the sorting variables.
Let us turn now to average excess returns. Countries with higher default probabilities o er higher returns. This is the rst order e ect, with a di erence of around 250 basis points between portfolios with low default probabilities (1 and 4) and portfolios with high default probabilities (3 and 6). Countries with larger values of j SIM pay higher returns. This is true at all levels of default probabilities. This is the second order e ect. The di erence in excess returns between low and high beta countries is particularly striking for countries with high default probabilities. It amounts to 130 basis points annually. This spread is signi cant. 12 It is not due to higher levels of debt, as the last panel shows. It is actually the opposite: high beta countries pay higher interest rates even if they borrow less in equilibrium. These features echo the characteristics of our EMBI bond portfolios. Comparing these spreads to their actual counterparts reported in table 1, we note, however, that both default probability and beta spreads are twice larger in the data than in the model. Table 10 reports the properties of portfolios formed on data obtained from the model's simulation with risk neutral lenders as in Arellano (2008) . When investors are risk neutral, countries with higher default probabilities o er higher returns. But it is not the case that high SIM countries pay higher returns and borrow less than low SIM countries.
Finally, Table 6 reports the principal component analysis of portfolios obtained on simulated data with risk-averse investors. Here again, the rst two principal components explain more than 80 percent of the total variance. The rst principal component is close to the average return across all portfolios, while the second principal component corresponds to an investment strategy that goes long the low-beta countries and short the high-beta countries. This principal component analysis parallels the one obtained on actual data and reported in Table 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that sovereign bond betas govern sovereign bond spreads. In the data, countries with higher bond betas pay higher borrowing rates. The di erence in spreads between countries with high and low betas is about 300 basis points. This is about half the spread di erence between low and high default probability countries.
Models of optimal borrowing and endogenous defaults with risk neutral investors cannot account for our empirical ndings. We o er one example of a general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing and defaults with risk-averse investors. In the model, borrowing countries only di er along one dimension: their endowments are more or less correlated to the lenders' consumption. Habit preferences lead to sizable spreads in returns between low and high default probability countries, and between high and low beta countries.
Yue, V. Z. (2006) Notes: This table reports, for each portfolio j, the average beta EMBI from a regression of EMBI returns on the total returns on the Merrill Lynch US BBB corporate bond index, the average EMBI log total excess return, the average Standard and Poor's credit rating, and the average external debt to GNP ratio. Excess returns are annualized and reported in percentage points. For excess returns, the table also reports Sharpe ratios, computed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. The portfolios are constructed by sorting EMBI countries on two dimensions: every month countries are sorted on their probability of default, measured by the S&P credit rating, and on EMBI . Note that Standard and Poor's uses letter grades to describe a country's credit worthiness. The table reports benchmark values for the parameters used in the simulation. These parameters imply an annualized risk-free rate r f in the large developed country equal to :94 percent per annum, a steady-state endowment ratio S L equal to :057 and a maximum surplus endowment ratio S L max of :094. The values for the direct output cost and the probability of re-entering nancial markets after a default are per quarter. All the other parameters are annualized, e.g. they are reported as 4c L , 2 L , 2 B , 4 , 4 , L 4 , B 4 and 4r f since the model is simulated at quarterly frequency. Values describing lenders' consumption growth are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and correspond to post-war US consumption data, values describing the borrowers' endowments are from Arellano (2008) . Notes: This table reports, for each portfolio j, the slope coe cient SIM from a regression of borrowers' output growth on the investors' consumption growth, the average excess return, the average expected probability of default and the debt to output ratio. Excess returns are annualized and reported in percentage points. For excess returns, the table also reports Sharpe ratios, computed as ratios of annualized means to annualized standard deviations. Data comes from simulating our model under the assumption of habit preferences for foreign lenders. The portfolios are constructed by sorting data for di erent countries obtained by simulating our model in two dimensions: every month, countries are sorted on expected default probabilities and on SIM . The sample has 600 quarters. The gure plots realized average EMBI excess returns on the vertical axis against predicted average excess returns on the horizontal axis. We regress actual excess returns on a constant and the risk factors R EMBI and LS EMBI to obtain slope coe cient j . Each predicted excess return is obtained using the OLS estimate j times the sample mean of the factors. All returns are annualized. Data is monthly. The sample period is 01/1995-08/2008. holdings and default policy functions. Given the optimal default policy function found in the previous step, we update the bond price function Q 1 (B 0 ; x) according to 3.4. If a convergence criterion is satis ed, we stop. If not, we use the updated price function to compute new values for the optimal consumption, asset holdings and default policy functions and repeat this routine up to the point that maxfQ i (B 0 ; x) Q i+1 (B 0 x)g < 10 7 : In order to obtain business cycle statistics, we simulate for 100 times 5000 quarters of data and compute moments as averages of the last 3000 observations for each simulation.
Appendix C One Application: Argentina
To check our model, we study the limit case of two countries. We estimate a low value for i for Argentina equal to 0:05. Given the low correlation between Argentina's endowment and U.S. consumption growth, results should not di er signi cantly from those obtained by Arellano (2008) . We solve the model numerically, simulate 5,000 quarters and then compute relevant moments using the last 3,000 quarters. We repeat this process 100 times and then reports means and standard deviations in table 8 next to the results in Arellano (2008) and the actual data for Argentina.
The borrower defaults approximately 4 times every 100 years, the average spread over the risk free rate and the ratio of debt to GDP are lower than in the data. The value for the spread is comparable to that in Arellano (2008) , the value for the debt to GDP ratio is signi cantly larger. She reports a measure of interest rate spread with respect to an exogenous risk free rate of 4 percent, while in our model the risk free rate is endogenous with a mean annualized value of about 1 percent. Consumption is more volatile than income, a consistent feature of the emerging market business cycle. When output is higher, the cost of debt is lower.
In this model, the trade balance nx is equal to the capital ows Q t B t+1 t B t t 1 . As a result, the trade balance decreases when output increases: countries borrow more when output is higher, again a consistent feature of emerging markets according to Neumeyer and Perri (2005) . This evidence suggests the existence of credit rationing in emerging markets and supports the assumption of the asymmetric output cost described in section (3.2). Even though the model replicates the sign of the negative correlation between trade balance and output, it is not able to match its exact magnitude. This is not surprising: the stochastic process for the endowment is a simple AR(1) process with no stochastic trend. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) argue very e ectively that "the cycle is the trend," meaning that a large part of the emerging market's business cycle is explained by shocks to trend. In their model, after a positive shock to trend, agent expect higher output from that period onward. Therefore, agents borrow to smooth consumption over time. The response to a positive shock to output around a stable trend is very di erent: agents increase savings to maintain a smooth consumption path in the future. In Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) shocks to trend generate the negative correlation between output and the trade balance. In this model, the high persistence of the endowment shock and the asymmetric default cost structure explain the negative correlation of output with respect to the interest rate spread and the trade balance. After a positive shock to output, agents expects output to be relatively high for some time. Because the default probability and the interest rate spread are relatively lower when output is high, agents borrow more in good times. The model also successfully reproduces the positive relation between cost of debt and the trade balance that is found in the data: when countries borrow more, the spread is lower.
Appendix D Lenders: Risk Neutral and Power Utility Cases Table 9 reports the properties of 9 portfolios constructed using data from a model where foreign investors' preferences are as follows:
where C L t is the exogenous endowment received by the investors every period. In this case, the vector of exogenous state x contains only one variable: y L . We simulate this model using the parameters in table 4 to characterize the endowment process in the small open economies and in the large developed economy. We choose values for = 20%, = 3% and B = 0:82 to match an average default probability of 3 percent per annum. We choose a value for L = 0:99 to match a risk-free rate of 4 percent per annum. This version of the model with foreign investors characterized by power utility function reproduces only qualitatively our empirical ndings. The spread along the beta-dimension is positive but small. Table 10 reports the properties of 9 portfolios formed on data obtained from the model's simulation with risk neutral lenders as in Arellano (2008) . All the other parameters used in the simulation are those use in the model with power utility. When investors are risk neutral, countries with higher default probability o er higher returns as in the case of risk averse investors. However, there is no spread along the beta dimension.
Appendix E Data: EMBI Global Sample Table 11 reports the EMBI stripped spreads for our sample. All spreads are annual. Table 12 reports the ratio of debt to GDP for the countries in our sample, using data from the Global Development Finance. Table 4 . The rst column in each of the three panels reports the results from our simulation. We use our model to simulate 5000 quarters, use the last 3000 quarters to compute moments and repeat this algorithm 100 times. We report averages of the moments from the 100 Montecarlo simulations. Arellano (2008) . The rst panel reports the average debt/GDP, the average annual bond spread and the average annual default probability. The second panel contains the standard deviation of the de-trended borrower's output, consumption, trade balance and interest rate spread at quarterly frequency. The third panel contain the correlation coe cients between borrower's output and consumption, output and interest rate spread, output and trade balance and interest rate spread and trade balance (all the series are de-trended). Average probability that a country is in portfolio j at time t + 1 conditional on being in portfolio i at time t, where i; j are respectively the rows and columns of the table. Data are monthly. 
